We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nash equilibrium and in a social optimum, that we call selfishness level . It is the smallest fraction of the social welfare that needs to be offered to each player to achieve that a social optimum is realized in a pure Nash equilibrium. The selfishness level is unrelated to the price of stability and the price of anarchy and in contrast to these notions is invariant under positive linear transformations of the payoff functions. Also, it naturally applies to other solution concepts and other forms of games.
Introduction

Motivation
The discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nash equilibrium and in a social optimum has been long recognized by the economists. One of the flagship examples is Cournot competition, a strategic game involving firms that simultaneously choose the production levels of a homogeneous product. The payoff functions in this game describe the firms' profit in the presence of some production costs, under the assumption that the price of the product depends negatively on the total output. It is well-known, see, e.g., [15, pages 174-175] , that the price in the social optimum is strictly higher than in the Nash equilibrium, which shows that the competition between the producers of a product drives its price down.
In computer science the above discrepancy led to the introduction of the notions of the price of anarchy [17] and the price of stability [27] that measure the ratio between the social welfare in a worst and, respectively, a best Nash equilibrium and a social optimum. This originated a huge research effort aiming at determining both ratios for specific strategic games that possess (pure) Nash equilibria.
These two notions are descriptive in the sense that they refer to an existing situation. In contrast, we propose a notion that measures the discrepancy between the social welfare in a Nash equilibrium and a social optimum, which is normative, in the sense that it refers to a modified situation. On an abstract level, the approach that we propose here is discussed in [4] , in chapter "How to Promote Cooperation", from where we cite (see page 134): "An excellent way to promote cooperation in a society is to teach people to care about the welfare of others."
Our approach draws on the concept of altruistic games (see, e.g., [18] and more recent [19] ). In these games each player's payoff is modified by adding a positive fraction α of the social welfare in the considered joint strategy to the original payoff. The selfishness level of a game is defined as the infimum over all α ≥ 0 for which such a modification yields that a social optimum is realized in a pure Nash equilibrium.
Intuitively, the selfishness level of a game can be viewed as a measure of the players' willingness to cooperate. A low selfishness level indicates that the players are open to align their interests in the sense that a small share of the social welfare is sufficient to motivate them to choose a social optimum. In contrast, a high selfishness level suggests that the players are reluctant to cooperate and a large share of the social welfare is needed to stimulate cooperation among them. An infinite selfishness level means that cooperation cannot be achieved through such means.
Often the selfishness level of a strategic game provides better insights into the game under consideration than other measures of inefficiency, such as the price of stability or the price of anarchy. To illustrate this point, we elaborate on our findings for the public goods game with n players. In this game, every player i chooses an amount s i ∈ [0, b] that he wants to contribute to a public good. A central authority collects all individual contributions, multiplies their sum by c > 1 (here we assume for simplicity that n ≥ c) and distributes the resulting amount evenly among all players. The payoff of player i is thus p i (s) := b − s i + c n j s j . In the (unique) Nash equilibrium, every player attempts to "free ride" by contributing 0 to the public good (which is a dominant strategy), while in the social optimum every player contributes the full amount of b. As we will show, the selfishness level of this game is (1 − c n )/(c − 1). This bound suggests that the temptation to free ride (i) increases as the number of players grows and (ii) decreases as the parameter c increases. Both phenomena were observed by experimental economists, see, e.g., [ 18, Section III.C.2]. In contrast, the price of stability (which coincides with the price of anarchy) for this game is c, which is rather uninformative.
In this paper, we define the selfishness level by taking pure Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. This is in line with how the price of anarchy and price of stability were defined originally [17, 27] . However, the definition applies equally well to other solution concepts and other forms of games.
Our contributions
The main contributions presented in this paper are as follows:
1. We introduce (in Section 2) the notion of selfishness level of a game, derive some basic properties and elaborate on some connections to other efficiency measures and models of altruism.
In particular, we show that the selfishness level of a game is unrelated to the price of stability and the price of anarchy. Moreover, unlike these notions, the selfishness level is invariant under positive linear transformations of the payoff functions. We also show that our model is equivalent to other models of altruism that have been studied before. As a consequence, our bounds on the selfishness level directly transfer to these alternative models.
2. We derive (in Section 3) a characterization result that allows us to determine the selfishness level of a strategic game.
Our characterization shows that the selfishness level is determined by the maximum appeal factor of unilateral profitable deviations from specific social optima, which we call stable. As a result, we can focus on deviations from these stable social optima only. Intuitively, the appeal factor of a single player deviation refers to the ratio of the gain in his payoff over the resulting loss in social welfare.
3. We use (in Section 4) our characterization result to analyze the selfishness level of several classical strategic games.
The games that we study are fundamental and often used to illustrate the consequences of selfish behavior and the effects of competition. A summary of our results is given in Table 1 . In particular, we derive explicit bounds on the selfishness level of fair cost sharing games and congestion games with linear delay functions. These bounds depend on the specific parameters of the underlying game, but are independent of the number of players and facilities; moreover, these bounds are tight.
Game
Selfishness level
Ordinal Public goods game max{0,
Cournout competition ∞
Tragedy of the commons ∞
Bertrand competition ∞ Table 1 : Selfishness level of the games studied in this paper. † see Section 4 for the definitions of the respective parameters of the games.
4. We also show (in Section 5) that our selfishness level notion naturally extends to other solution concepts and other types of games, for instance mixed Nash equilibria and extensive games.
Related work
There are only few articles in the algorithmic game theory literature that study the influence of altruism in strategic games [8, 9, 10, 12, 14] . In these works, altruistic player behavior is modeled by altering each player's perceived payoff in order to account also for the welfare of others. The models differ in the way they combine the player's individual payoff with the payoffs of the other players. All these studies are descriptive in the sense that they aim at understanding the impact of altruistic behavior on specific strategic games. Closest to our work are the articles [12] and [9] . Elias et al. [12] study the inefficiency of equilibria in network design games (which constitute a special case of the cost sharing games considered here) with altruistic (or, as they call it, socially-aware) players. As we do here, they define each player's cost function as his individual cost plus α times the social cost. They derive lower and upper bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability, respectively, of the modified game. In particular, they show that the price of stability is at most (H n + α)/(1 + α), where n is the number of players.
Chen et al. [9] introduce a framework to study the robust price of anarchy, which refers to the worst-case inefficiency of other solution concepts such as coarse correlated equilibria (see [26] ) of altruistic extensions of strategic games. In their model, player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of (1 − γ i ) times his individual cost plus γ i times the social cost, where γ i ∈ [0, 1] is the altruism level of player i. If all players have a uniform altruism level γ i = γ, this model relates to the one we consider here by setting α = γ/(1 − γ) (see Section 2.3 for details). Although not being the main focus of the paper, the authors also provide upper bounds of 2/(1 + γ) and (1 − γ)H n + γ on the price of stability for linear congestion games and fair cost sharing games, respectively.
Note that in all three cases mentioned above the price of stability approaches 1 as α goes to ∞. This seems to suggest that the selfishness level of these games is ∞. However, this is not the case as our analyses reveal.
Two other models of altruism were proposed in the literature. Chen and Kempe [10] define the perceived cost of a player as (1 − β) times his individual cost plus β/n times the social cost, where β ∈ [0, 1]. Caragiannis et al. [8] define the perceived cost of player i as (1 − δ) times his individual cost plus δ times the sum of the costs of all other players (i.e., excluding player i), where δ ∈ [0, 1]. Also these two models can be shown to be equivalent to our model using simple transformations (see Section 2.3 for details).
Conceptually, our selfishness level notion is related to the Stackelberg threshold introduced by Sharma and Williamson [28] ; see also [16] . The authors consider network routing games in which a fraction of β ∈ [0, 1] of the flow is first routed centrally and the remaining flow is then routed selfishly. The Stackelberg threshold refers to the smallest value of β that is needed to improve upon the social cost of a Nash equilibrium flow. In a related paper, Hoefer and Skopalik [14] study the minimum number, termed the optimal stability threshold, of (pure) altruists that are needed in a congestion game to induce a Nash equilibrium as a social optimum. They show that this number can be computed in polynomial time for singleton congestion games.
In network congestion games, researchers studied the effect of imposing tolls on the edges of the network in order to reduce the inefficiency of Nash equilibria; see, e.g., [6] . From a high-level perspective, these approaches can also be regarded as being normative.
Selfishness level 2.1 Definition
A strategic game (in short, a game) G = (N, {S i } i∈N , {p i } i∈N ) is given by a set N = {1, . . . , n} of n > 1 players, a non-empty set of strategies S i for every player i ∈ N , and a payoff function p i for every player i ∈ N with p i : S 1 ×· · ·×S n → R. The players choose their strategies simultaneously and every player i ∈ N aims at choosing a strategy s i ∈ S i so as to maximize his individual payoff p i (s), where s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ).
We call s ∈ S 1 × · · · × S n a joint strategy , denote its ith element by s i , denote (s 1 , . . . , s i−1 , s i+1 , . . . , s n ) by s −i and similarly with S −i . Further, we write (s ′ i , s −i ) for (s 1 , . . . , s i−1 , s ′ i , s i+1 , . . . , s n ), where we assume that s ′ i ∈ S i . Sometimes, when focussing on player i we write (s i , s −i ) instead of s.
A strategic game G = (N, {S i } i∈N , {p i } i∈N ) is symmetric if all players have the same set of strategies and the payoff for playing a particular strategy only depends on the strategies played by the other players (but not on their identities); more formally, S i = S j for every i, j ∈ N , i = j, and for every joint strategy s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ), for every i ∈ N and every permutation π of {1, . . . , n}, we have p i (s 1 , . . . , s n ) = p π(i) (s π(1) , . . . , s π(n) ).
A joint strategy s is a Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
Further, given a joint strategy s we call the sum SW (s) := n i=1 p i (s) the social welfare of s. When the social welfare of s is maximal we call s a social optimum .
Given a strategic game G := (N, {S i } i∈N , {p i } i∈N ) and α ≥ 0 we define the game G(α) := (N, {S i } i∈N , {r i } i∈N ) by putting r i (s) := p i (s) + αSW (s). So when α > 0 the payoff of each player in the G(α) game depends on the social welfare of the players. G(α) is then an altruistic version of the game G.
Suppose now that for some α ≥ 0 a pure Nash equilibrium of G(α) is a social optimum of G(α). Then we say that G is α-selfish . We define the selfishness level of
Here we adopt the convention that the infimum of an empty set is ∞. Further, we stipulate that the selfishness level of G is denoted by α + iff the selfishness level of G is α ∈ R + but G is not α-selfish (equivalently, the infimum does not belong to the set). We show below (Theorem 2) that pathological infinite games exist for which the selfishness level is of this kind; none of the other studied games is of this type.
We give some remarks before we proceed.
1. The above definitions refer to strategic games in which each player i maximizes his payoff function p i and the social welfare of a joint strategy s is given by SW (s). These definitions apply similarly to strategic games in which every player i minimizes his cost function c i and the social cost of a joint strategy s is defined as SC(
2. Other definitions of an altruistic version of a game are conceivable and, depending on the underlying application, might seem more natural than the one we use here. However, we show in Section 2.3 that our definition is equivalent to several other models of altruism that have been proposed in the literature.
3. The selfishness level refers to the smallest α such that some Nash equilibrium in G(α) is also a social optimum. Alternatively, one might be interested in the smallest α such that every Nash equilibrium in G(α) corresponds to a social optimum. However, as argued in Section 2.2, this alternative notion is not very meaningful.
4. The definition extends in the obvious way to other solution concepts (e.g., mixed or correlated equilibria) and other forms of games (e.g., subgame perfect equilibria in extensive games). We briefly comment on these extensions in Section 5.
Note that the social welfare of a joint strategy s in G(α) equals (1 + αn)SW (s), so the social optima of G and G(α) coincide. Hence we can replace in the above definition the reference to a social optimum of G(α) by one to a social optimum of G. This is what we shall do in the proofs below. Intuitively, a low selfishness level means that the share of the social welfare needed to induce the players to choose a social optimum is small. This share can be viewed as an 'incentive' needed to realize a social optimum. Let us illustrate this definition on various simple examples.
Consider the Prisoner's Dilemma game G (on the left) and the resulting game G(α) for α = 1 (on the right). In the latter game the social optimum, (C, C), is also a Nash equilibrium. One can easily check that for α < 1, (C, C) is also a social optimum of G(α) but not a Nash equilibrium. So the selfishness level of this game is 1.
Example 2. Battle of the Sexes
Here each Nash equilibrium is also a social optimum, so the selfishness level of this game is 0.
Example 3. Matching Pennies
Since the social welfare of each joint strategy is 0, for each α the game G(α) is identical to the original game in which no Nash equilibrium exists. So the selfishness level of this game is ∞. More generally, the selfishness level of a constant sum game is 0 if it has a Nash equilibrium and otherwise it is ∞.
Example 4. Game with a bad Nash equilibrium
The following game results from equipping each player in the Matching Pennies game with a third strategy E (for edge):
Its unique Nash equilibrium is (E, E). It is easy to check that the selfishness level of this game is ∞. (This is also an immediate consequence of Theorem 4 (iii) below.)
Example 5. Game with no Nash equilibrium Consider a game G on the left and the resulting game G(α) for α = 1 on the right.
The game G has no Nash equilibrium, while in the game G(1) the social optimum, (C, C), is also a Nash equilibrium. As in the Prisoner's Dilemma game one can easily check that for α < 1, (C, C) is also a social optimum of G(α) but not a Nash equilibrium. So the selfishness level of the game G is 1.
Properties
Recall that, given a finite game G that has a Nash equilibrium, its price of stability is the ratio SW (s)/SW (s ′ ) where s is a social optimum and s ′ is a Nash equilibrium with the highest social welfare in G. The price of anarchy is defined as the ratio SW (s)/SW (s ′ ) where s is a social optimum and s ′ is a Nash equilibrium with the lowest social welfare in G.
So the price of stability of G is 1 iff its selfishness level is 0. However, in general there is no relation between these two notions. The following observation also shows that the selfishness level of a finite game can be an arbitrary real number. Theorem 1. For every finite α > 0 and β > 1 there is a finite game whose selfishness level is α and whose price of stability is β.
Proof. Consider the following generalized form, which we denote by P D(α, β), of the Prisoner's Dilemma game G with x = α α+1 :
In this game and in each game G(γ) with γ ≥ 0, (C, C) is the unique social optimum. To compute the selfishness level we need to consider a game G(γ) and stipulate that (C, C) is its Nash equilibrium. This leads to the inequality 1 + 2γ ≥ (γ + 1)(x + 1), from which it follows that γ ≥ x 1−x , i.e., γ ≥ α. So the selfishness level of G is α. Moreover, its price of stability is β.
We defined the selfishness level of a game as the smallest α such that the price of stability of G(α) is 1. Alternatively, one might want to define the selfishness level as the smallest α such that the price of anarchy of G(α) is 1. But as it turns out, this notion is not very informative. Namely, as noted already above, the social welfare of a joint strategy s in G(α) equals (1 + αn)SW (s). So if for two joint strategies s and s ′ we have SW (s) < SW (s ′ ) in G, then this inequality remains valid when using the social welfare in G(α). Hence, for no α the joint strategy s can be a social optimum in G(α). In particular, this also holds if s and s ′ are Nash equilibria. Thus, with this alternative definition, the only possible levels would be 0 (when all Nash equilibria of G have the same social welfare) or ∞ (otherwise).
Further, in contrast to the price of stability and the price of anarchy the notion of the selfishness level is invariant under simple payoff transformations. It is a direct consequence of the following observation, where given a game G and a value a we denote by G + a (respectively, aG) the game obtained from G by adding to each payoff function the value a (respectively, by multiplying each payoff function by a). Proposition 1. Consider a game G and α ≥ 0.
Proof. (i) It suffices to note that r[a] i (s) = r i (s) + αan + a, where r i and r[a] i are the payoff functions of player i in the games G(α) and (G+a)(α). So for every joint strategy s
• s is a Nash equilibrium of G(α) iff it is a Nash equilibrium of (G + a)(α),
• s is social optimum of G(α) iff it is a social optimum of (G + a)(α).
(ii) It suffices to note that for every a > 0, r[a] i (s) = ar i (s), where this time r[a] i is the payoff function of player i in the game (aG)(α), and argue as above.
In particular, for symmetric games Proposition 1 implies that the selfishness level is invariant under affine transformations of the payoff functions.
Note that the selfishness level is not invariant under a multiplication of the payoff functions by a value a ≤ 0. Indeed, for a = 0 each game aG has the selfishness level 0. For a < 0 take the game G from Example 4 whose selfishness level is ∞. In the game aG the joint strategy (E, E) is both a Nash equilibrium and a social optimum, so the selfishness level of aG is 0.
The above proposition also allows us to frame the notion of selfishness level in the following way. Suppose the original n-player game G is given to a game designer who has a fixed budget of SW (s) for each joint strategy s and that the selfishness level of G is α < ∞. How should the game designer then distribute the budget of SW (s) for each joint strategy s among the players such that the resulting game has a Nash equilibrium that coincides with a social optimum? By scaling G(α) by the factor a := 1/(1 + αn) we ensure that for each joint strategy s its social welfare in the original game G and in aG(α) is the same. Using Proposition 1, we conclude that α is the smallest non-negative real such that aG(α) has a Nash equilibrium that is a social optimum. The game aG(α) can then be viewed as the intended transformation of G. That is, each payoff function p i of the game G is transformed into the payoff function
Let us return now to the 'borderline case' of the selfishness level that we denoted by α + . We have the following result.
Theorem 2. For every α ≥ 0 there exists a game whose selfishness level is α + .
Proof. We first prove the result for α = 0. That is, we show that there exists a game that is α-selfish for every α > 0, but is not 0-selfish. To this end we use the games P D(α, β) defined in the proof of Theorem 1.
We construct a strategic game G = (N, {S i } i∈N , {p i } i∈N ) with two players N = {1, 2} by combining, for an arbitrary but fixed β > 1, infinitely many P D(α, β) games with α > 0 as follows: For each α > 0 we rename the strategies of the P D(α, β) game to, respectively, C(α) and D(α) and denote the corresponding payoff functions by p α i . The set of strategies of each player i ∈ N is S i = {C(α) | α > 0} ∪ {D(α) | α > 0} and the payoff of i is defined as
Every social optimum of G is of the form (C(α), C(α)), where α > 0. (Note that we exploit that β > 1 here.) By the argument given in the proof of Theorem 1, (C(α), C(α)) with α > 0 is a Nash equilibrium in the game G(α) because the deviations from C(α) to a strategy C(γ) or D(γ) with γ = α yield a payoff of 0. Thus, G is α-selfish for every α > 0. Finally, observe that G is not 0-selfish because every Nash equilibrium of G is of the form (D(α), D(α)), where α > 0.
To deal with the general case we prove two claims that are of independent interest. Claim 1. For every game G and α ≥ 0 there is a game
Proof. We define the payoff of player i in the game G ′ by
where p i is his payoff in the game G. Denote by SW ′ (s) the social welfare of a joint strategy s in the game G ′ and by r ′ i the payoff function of player i in the game G ′ (α). Then
Claim 2. For every game G and α, β ≥ 0
Proof. Denote by SW ′ (s) the social welfare of a joint strategy s in the game G(α), by p i , r i and r ′ the payoff functions of player i in the games G, G(α), and G(α)(
which proves the claim. 2 To prove the general case fix α ≥ 0 and β > 0 and take a game G whose selfishness level is 0 + . By Claim 1 there is a game
Further, by Claim 2
But by its choice the game G is β 1+nα -selfish, so G ′ is α + β-selfish, which concludes the proof.
Alternative definitions
Our definition of the selfishness level depends on the way the altruistic versions of the original game are defined. Three other models of altruism were proposed in the literature. As before, let G := (N, {S i } i∈N , {p i } i∈N ) be a strategic game. Consider the following four definitions of altruistic versions of G:
Our selfishness level notion for Model A extends to Models B, C and D in the obvious way: We say that G is β-selfish for some β ∈ [0, 1] iff a pure Nash equilibrium of the altruistic version G(β) is also a social optimum. The selfishness level of G with respect to Model B is then defined as the infimum over all β ∈ [0, 1] such that G is β-selfish. The respective notions for Models C and D are defined analogously.
The following theorem shows that the selfishness level of a game with respect to Models A, B, C and D relate to each other via simple transformations. (Note that for Model D this transformation only applies for δ ∈ [0,
Theorem 3. Consider a strategic game G := (N, {S i } i∈N , {p i } i∈N ) and its altruistic versions defined according to Models A, B, C and D above.
Proof. We prove the following more general claim. Fix x, y > 0. For every λ ∈ [0,
We show that
. By substituting λ = αy 1+αxy in (6), we obtain
As a consequence, since 1 1+αxy > 0 for every α ≥ 0 the pure Nash equilibria and social optima, respectively, of G(λ) and
That is, the selfishness level of G with respect to Model A is ∞ iff the selfishness level of G with respect to G(λ) is 1 x . Now, (i) follows from the above with x = 1 and y = n, (ii) follows with x = y = 1 and (iii) follows with x = 2 and y = 1.
A characterization result
We now characterize the games with a finite selfishness level. To this end we shall need the following notion. We call a social optimum s stable if for all i ∈ N and s ′ i ∈ S i the following holds:
In other words, a social optimum is stable if no player is better off by unilaterally deviating to another social optimum.
It will turn out that to determine the selfishness level of a game we need to consider deviations from its stable social optima.
.
In what follows we shall characterize the selfishness level in terms of bounds on the appeal factors of profitable deviations from a stable social optimum. First, note the following properties of social optima. Lemma 1. Consider a strategic game G := (N, {S i } i∈N , {p i } i∈N ) and α ≥ 0.
(i) If s is both a Nash equilibrium of G(α) and a social optimum of G, then s is a stable social optimum of G.
(ii) If s is a stable social optimum of G, then s is a Nash equilibrium of G(α) iff for all i ∈ N and
, where
The set U i (s), with the ">" sign replaced by "≥", is called an upper contour set, see, e.g., [24, page 193] . Note that if s is a stable social optimum, then
Proof. (i) Suppose that s is both a Nash equilibrium of G(α) and a social optimum of G. Consider some joint strategy (s ′ i , s −i ) that is a social optimum. By the definition of a Nash equilibrium
(ii) Suppose that s is a stable social optimum of G. Then s is a Nash equilibrium of G(α) iff for all i ∈ N and
holds for all i ∈ N and s ′ i ∈ U i (s).
This leads us to the following result.
Theorem 4. Consider a strategic game G := (N, {S i } i∈N , {p i } i∈N ).
(i) The selfishness level of G is finite iff a stable social optimum s exists for which
(ii) If the selfishness level of G is finite, then it equals min s∈SSO α(s), where SSO is the set of stable social optima.
(iii) If G is finite, then its selfishness level is finite iff it has a stable social optimum.
In particular, if G has a unique social optimum, then its selfishness level is finite.
Proof. (i) and (iv) follow by Lemma 1, (ii) by (i) and Lemma 1, and (iii) by (i).
Using the above theorem we now exhibit a class of games for n players for which the selfishness level is unbounded. In fact, the following more general result holds.
Theorem 5. For each function f : N → R + there exists a class of games for n players, where n > 1, such that the selfishness level of a game for n players equals f (n).
Proof. Assume n > 1 players and that each player has two strategies, 1 and 0. Denote by 1 the joint strategy in which each strategy equals 1 and by 1 −i the joint strategy of the opponents of player i in which each entry equals 1. The payoff for each player i is defined as follows:
otherwise.
So when s = 1, p i (s) = f (n) if i is the smallest index of a player with s i = 0 and otherwise
n−1 . Note that SW (1) = 0 and SW (s) = −1 if s = 1. So 1 is a unique social optimum.
We have p i (0, 1 −i ) − p i (1) = f (n) and SW (1) − SW (0, 1 −i ) = 1. So by Theorem 4 (ii) the selfishness level equals f (n).
Examples
We now use the above characterization result to determine or compute an upper bound on the selfishness level of some selected games. First, we exhibit a well-known class of games (see [21] ) for which the selfishness level is finite.
Ordinal potential games
Given a game G := (N, {S i } i∈N , {p i } i∈N ), a function P :
A game that possesses an ordinal potential function is called an ordinal potential game.
Theorem 6. Every finite ordinal potential game has a finite selfishness level.
Proof. Each social optimum with the largest potential is a stable social optimum. So the claim follows by Theorem 4 (ii).
In particular, every finite congestion game (see [25] ) has a finite selfishness level. We shall derive explicit bounds for two special cases of these games in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
Weakly acyclic games
Following [21] , given a game G := (N, {S i } i∈N , {p i } i∈N ), a path in S 1 × · · · × S n is a sequence (s 1 , s 2 , . . . ) of joint strategies such that for every k > 1 there is a player i such that s k = (s ′ i , s
. A path is called an improvement path if it is maximal and for all k > 1, p i (s k ) > p i (s k−1 ), where i is the player who deviated from s k−1 . A game G has the finite improvement property (FIP ) if every improvement path is finite. Following [20, 30] , a game G is called weakly acyclic if for every joint strategy there exists a finite improvement path that starts at it.
Finite games that have the FIP coincide with the ordinal potential games. So by Theorem 6 these games have a finite selfishness level. In contrast, the selfishness level of a weakly acyclic game can be infinite. Indeed, the following game is easily seen to be weakly acyclic:
Yet, on the account of Theorem 4 (iii), its selfishness level is infinite.
Fair cost sharing games
In a fair cost sharing game, see, e.g., [1] , players allocate facilities and share the cost of the used facilities in a fair manner. Formally, a fair cost sharing game is given by G = (N, E, {S i } i∈N , {c e } e∈E ), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, E is the set of facilities, S i ⊆ 2 E is the set of facility subsets available to player i, and c e ∈ R + is the cost of facility e ∈ E. It is called a singleton cost sharing game if for every i ∈ N and for every s i ∈ S i : |s i | = 1. For a joint strategy s ∈ S 1 × · · · × S n let x e (s) be the number of players using facility e ∈ E, i.e., x e (s) = |{i ∈ N | e ∈ s i }|. The cost of a facility e ∈ E is evenly shared among the players using it. That is, the cost of player i is defined as c i (s) = e∈s i c e /x e (s). The social cost function is given by SC(s) = i∈N c i (s). We first consider singleton cost sharing games. Let c max = max e∈E c e and c min = min e∈E c e refer to the maximum and minimum costs of the facilities, respectively. Proposition 2. The selfishness level of a singleton cost sharing game is at most max{0, This result should be contrasted with the price of stability of H n and the price of anarchy of n for cost sharing games [1] . Cost sharing games admit an exact potential function and thus by Theorem 6 their selfishness level is finite. However, as the tight example given in the proof of Proposition 2 below shows, the selfishness level can be arbitrarily large (as c max /c min → ∞) even for n = 2 players and two facilities.
In order to prove Proposition 2, we first derive an expression of the appeal factor for arbitrary fair cost sharing games, which we then specialize to singleton cost sharing games to prove the claim.
Let s be a stable social optimum. Note that s exists by Theorem 4 (iii) and Theorem 6. Because we consider a cost minimization game here the appeal factor of player i is defined as
and the condition in Theorem 4 (i) reads α(s) := max i∈N,
We use x e and x ′ e to refer to x e (s) and x e (s ′ ), respectively. Note that
We have
Further, it is not difficult to verify that
Thus, 
We use the above to prove Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let s be a stable social optimum (which exists by Theorem 4 (iii) and Theorem 6). If U i (s) = ∅ for every i ∈ N then the selfishness level is 0 by Theorem 4 (ii). Otherwise, there is some player i ∈ N with U i (s) = ∅. Recall that in a singleton cost sharing game, each player's strategy set consists of singleton facility sets. Let s i = {e} and s ′ i = {e ′ } be the singleton sets of the facilities chosen by player i in s and in s ′ = (s ′ i , s −i ) with s ′ i ∈ U i (s). Clearly, e = e ′ . Note that SC(s ′ i , s −i ) − SC(s) must be positive because s ′ i ∈ U i (s) and thus (11) implies that x e ′ = 0. Therefore, (10) reduces to c i (s) − c i (s ′ i , s −i ) = c e /x e − c e ′ . If x e = 1 then c e > c e ′ because s ′ i ∈ U i (s). But this is a contradiction to the assumption that SC(s ′ i , s −i ) − SC(s) = c e ′ − c e > 0. Thus x e ≥ 2. Note that this also implies that c e > 2c e ′ and thus c max > 2c min .
Using (12), we obtain
The claim now follows by Theorem 4 (ii).
The following example shows that this bound is tight. Suppose N = {1, 2}, E = {e 1 , e 2 }, S 1 = {{e 1 }}, S 2 = {{e 1 }, {e 2 }}, c e 1 = c max and c e 2 = c min with c max > 2c min . The joint strategy s = ({e 1 }, {e 1 }) is the unique social optimum with SC(s) = c max and c 2 (s) = c max /2. Suppose player 2 deviates to s
The following example shows that a bound similar to the one above, i.e., bounding the selfishness level in terms of the ratio c max /c min , does not hold for arbitrary fair cost sharing games. In particular, it shows that the minimum difference between any two costs of facilities (here ε) must enter a bound of the selfishness level for arbitrary fair cost sharing games. Example 6. Let N = {1, 2}, E = {e 1 , e 2 , e 3 }, S 1 = {{e 1 }}, S 2 = {{e 1 , e 3 }, {e 2 }}, c e 1 = c max , c e 2 = c min + ε for some ε > 0 and c e 3 = c min . The joint strategy s = ({e 1 }, {e 1 , e 3 }) is the unique social optimum with SC(s) = c max + c min and c 2 (s) = c max /2+c min . Suppose player 2 deviates to s ′ 2 = {e 2 }. Then SC(s ′ 2 , s 1 ) = c max +c min +ε and c 2 (s ′ 2 , s 1 ) = c min + ε.
We next derive a bound for arbitrary fair cost sharing games with non-negative integer costs. Let L be the maximum number of facilities that any player can choose, i.e., L := max i∈N,s i ∈S i |s i |.
Proposition 3.
The selfishness level of a fair cost sharing game with non-negative integer costs is at most max{0, Proof. Let s be a stable social optimum. As in the proof of Proposition 2, if U i (s) = ∅ for every i ∈ N then the selfishness level is 0 by Theorem 4 (ii). Otherwise, there is some player i ∈ N with 
The claim follows by Theorem 4 (ii).
The following example shows that the bound is tight. Suppose we are given L and c max . Let N = {1, . . . , n} and E = {e 1 , . . . , e n } where n = L + 1. Define S i = {{e i }} for every i ∈ N \ {n} and S n = {{e 1 , . . . , e n−1 }, {e n }}. Let c e i = c max for every i ∈ N \ {n} and c en = 1. The joint strategy s = ({e 1 }, . . . , {e n−1 }, {e 1 , . . . , e n−1 }) is the unique social optimum with SC(s) = (n − 1)c max and c n (s) = (n − 1)c max /2. Suppose player n deviates to s ′ n = {e n }. Then SC(s ′ n , s −n ) = (n − 1)c max + 1 and c n (s ′ n , s −n ) = 1. Thus
Remark 1. We can bound the selfishness level of a fair cost sharing game with nonnegative rational costs c e ∈ Q + for every facility e ∈ E by using Proposition 3 and the following scaling argument: Simply scale all costs to integers, e.g., by multiplying them with the least common multiplier q ∈ N of the denominators. Note that this scaling does not change the selfishness level of the game by Proposition 1. However, it does change the maximum facility cost and thus q enters the bound. Also note that this scaling implicitly takes care of the effect observed in Example 6: Suppose that c max and c min are integers and ǫ = 1/q for some q ∈ N. Then all costs are multiplied by q and Proposition 3 yields a bound of qc max − 1 (which approaches ∞ as q → ∞).
Linear congestion games
In a congestion game G := (N, E, {S i } i∈N , {d e } e∈E ) we are given a set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, a set of facilities E with a delay function d e : N → R + for every facility e ∈ E, and a strategy set S i ⊆ 2 E for every player i ∈ N . For a joint strategy s ∈ S 1 × · · · × S n , define x e (s) as the number of players using facility e ∈ E, i.e., x e (s) = |{i ∈ N | e ∈ s i }|. The goal of a player is to minimize his individual cost c i (s) = e∈s i d e (x e (s)). The social cost function is given by SC(s) = i∈N c i (s). Here we call a congestion game symmetric if there is some common strategy set S ⊆ 2 E such that S i = S for all i. It is singleton if every strategy s i ∈ S i is a singleton set, i.e., for every i ∈ N and for every s i ∈ S i , |s i | = 1. In a linear congestion game, the delay function of every facility e ∈ E is of the form d e (x) = a e x + b e , where a e , b e ∈ R + are non-negative real numbers. We first derive a bound on the selfishness level for symmetric singleton linear congestion games. As it turns out, a bound similar to the one for singleton cost sharing games does not extend to symmetric singleton linear congestion games. Instead, the crucial insight here is that the selfishness level depends on the discrepancy between facilities in a stable social optimum. We make this notion more precise.
Let s be a stable social optimum and let x e refer to x e (s). Define the discrepancy between two facilities e and e ′ with a e + a e ′ > 0 under s as δ(x e , x e ′ ) = 2a e x e + b e a e + a e ′ − 2a e ′ x e ′ + b e ′ a e + a e ′ .
We show below that δ(x e , x e ′ ) ∈ [−1, 1]. Define δ max (s) as the maximum discrepancy between any two facilities e and e ′ under s with a e + a e ′ > 0 and δ(x e , x e ′ ) < 1; more formally, let δ max (s) = max e,e ′ ∈E {δ(x e , x e ′ ) | a e + a e ′ > 0 and δ(x e , x e ′ ) < 1}. Let δ max be the maximum discrepancy over all stable social optima, i.e., δ max = max s∈SSO δ max (s). Further, let ∆ max := max e∈E (a e + b e ) and ∆ min := min e∈E (a e + b e ). Moreover, let a min be the minimum non-zero coefficient of a latency function, i.e., a min = min e∈E:ae>0 a e .
Proposition 4.
The selfishness level of a symmetric singleton linear congestion game is at most max 0, 1 2
Moreover, this bound is tight.
We first prove that the discrepancy between two facilities is bounded:
Claim 3. Let s be a social optimum and e, e ′ ∈ E be two facilities with a e + a e ′ > 0. Then the discrepancy between e and e ′ under s satisfies δ(x e , x e ′ ) ∈ [−1, 1].
Proof. Let t = x e + x e ′ be the total number of players on facilities e and e ′ under s. Note that because s is a social optimum and strategy sets are symmetric, t is distributed among x e and x e ′ such that the social cost of these two facilities is minimized. Said differently, x e = x minimizes the function
It is not hard to verify that the minimum of f (x, t) (for fixed t) is attained at the (not necessarily integral) pointx
Because f (x, t) is a parabola with its minimum atx 0 , the integral point x e that minimizes f (x, t) is given by the point obtained by roundingx 0 to the nearest integer. Let x e :=x 0 + 1 2 δ be this point, where δ = δ(x e , x e ′ ) ∈ [−1, 1], and x e ′ = t − x e . Note that the choice of δ is unique, unlessx 0 is half-integral in which case δ ∈ {−1, 1}. Solving these equations for δ yields the definition in (13) .
Proof of Proposition 4. Let s be a stable social optimum. Note that s exists by Theorem 4 (iii) and Theorem 6. If U i (s) = ∅ for every i ∈ N then the selfishness level is 0 by Theorem 4 (ii). Otherwise, there is some player i ∈ N with
We use x e and x ′ e to refer to x e (s) and x e (s ′ ) for every facility e ∈ E, respectively. Note that for every e ∈ E we have
Let s i = {e} and s ′ i = {e ′ } be the sets of facilities chosen by player i in s and s ′ , respectively. Exploiting (14), we obtain
Moreover,
Note that we have c i (
and by the definition of
Thus, it must hold that a e + a e ′ > 0; otherwise a e = a e ′ = 0 and (15) and (16) yield a contradiction. Let δ = δ(x e , x e ′ ) be the discrepancy between e and e ′ under s. Note that δ ∈ [−1, 1] by Claim 3. Using the definition of δ in (13), we can rewrite (15) and (16) as
. We conclude that δ = 1.
Thus,
The claim now follows by Theorem 4 (ii).
The following example shows that this bound is tight even for n = 2 players and two facilities. Let N = {1, 2}, E = {e, e ′ } and S 1 = S 2 = {{e}, {e ′ }}. Suppose we are given δ ∈ [0, 1) and a e ′ ∈ R + . Define d e (x) = (2 + δ)a e ′ and d e ′ (x) = a e ′ x. The joint strategy s = ({e}, {e ′ }) is the unique social optimum with SC(s) = (3 + δ)a e ′ . Further c 1 (s) = (2 + δ)a e ′ and c 2 (s) = a e ′ . Suppose player 1 deviates to
, which matches precisely the upper bound given above. The case δ ∈ [−1, 0] is proven analogously.
Observe that the selfishness level depends on the ratio (∆ max −∆ min )/a min and 1/(1− δ max ). In particular, the selfishness level becomes arbitrarily large as δ max approaches 1.
We next derive a bound for the selfishness level of arbitrary congestion games with linear delay functions and non-negative integer coefficients, i.e., d e (x) = a e x + b e with a e , b e ∈ N for every e ∈ E. Let L be the maximum number of facilities that any player can choose, i.e., L := max i∈N,s i ∈S i |s i |.
Proposition 5.
The selfishness level of a linear congestion game with non-negative integer coefficients is at most max{0, 1 2 (L∆ max − ∆ min − 1)}. Moreover, this bound is tight.
For linear congestion games, the price of anarchy is known to be 5 2 , see [11, 3] . In contrast, our bound shows that the selfishness level depends on the maximum number of facilities in a strategy set and the magnitude of the coefficients of the delay functions.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let s be a stable social optimum. Note that s exists by Theorem 4 (iii) and Theorem 6. If U i (s) = ∅ for every i ∈ N then the selfishness level is 0 by Theorem 4 (ii). Otherwise, there is some player i ∈ N with
We use x e and x ′ e to refer to x e (s) and x e (s ′ ), respectively. Exploiting (14), we obtain
(a e (x e + 1) + b e ).
Similarly, (a e (2x e − 1) + b e ).
Given a congestion vector x = (x e ) e∈E , define P (x) := e∈s i \s ′ i (a e x e + b e ) and Q(x) := e∈s ′ i \s i
(a e (x e + 1) + b e ). Note that P (x) and Q(x) are integers because a e , b e ∈ N for every facility e ∈ E. Note that with these definitions, P (1) = e∈s i \s ′ i (a e + b e ) and Q(0) = e∈s ′ i \s i (a e + b e ). We have
. Exploiting these inequalities, we obtain The following example shows that this bound is tight. Fix L, ∆ max and ∆ min such that (2n − 1)∆ min = L∆ max + 1 for some integer n. Consider a congestion game with N = {1, . . . , n} and E = {e 1 , . . . , e L+1 }. Define S i = {{e L+1 }} for every i ∈ N \ {n} and S n = {{e 1 , . . . , e L }, {e L+1 }}. Let d e L+1 (x) = ∆ min x and d e i (x) = ∆ max for every i ∈ {1, . . . , L}. For the joint strategy s = ({e L+1 }, . . . , {e L+1 }, {e 1 , . . . , e L }) we have SC(s) = ∆ min (n − 1) 2 + L∆ max and c n (s) = L∆ max . If player n deviates to s ′ n = {e L+1 } we have SC(s ′ n , s −n ) = ∆ min n 2 = ∆ min (n−1) 2 +∆ min (2n−1) and c n (s ′ n , s −n ) = ∆ min n. Exploiting that (2n − 1)∆ min = L∆ max + 1, we conclude that SC(s) < SC(s ′ n , s −n ) and c n (s) > c n (s ′ n , s −n ) (for n ≥ 3). Thus, s is a social optimum and s ′ n ∈ U i (s). We obtain
Remark 2. We can use Proposition 5 and the scaling argument outlined in Remark 1 to derive bounds on the selfishness level of congestion games with linear delay functions and non-negative rational coefficients.
Prisoner's dilemma for n players
We assume that each player i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} has two strategies, 1 (cooperate) and 0 (defect). We put p i (s) := 1 − s i + 2 j =i s j .
Proposition 6.
The selfishness level of the n-players Prisoner's Dilemma game is 1 2n−3 .
Intuitively, this means that when the number of players in the Prisoner's Dilemma game increases, a smaller share of the social welfare is needed to resolve the underlying conflict. That is, its 'acuteness' diminishes with the number of players. The formal reason is that the appeal factor of each unilateral deviation from the social optimum is inversely proportional to the number of players.
Proof. In this game s = 1 is the unique social optimum, with for each i ∈ N , p i (s) = 2(n − 1) and SW (s) = 2n(n − 1). Consider now the joint strategy (s ′ i , s −i ) in which player i deviates to the strategy s ′ i = 0. We have then
In particular, for n = 2 we get, as already argued in Example 1, that the selfishness level of the original Prisoner's Dilemma game is 1.
Public goods
We consider the public goods game with n players. Every player i ∈ N = {1, . . . In this game, every player has an incentive to "free ride" by contributing 0 to the public good (which is a dominant strategy). This is exactly as in the n-players Prisoner's Dilemma game. However, the above proposition reveals that for fixed c, in contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma game, this temptation becomes stronger as the number of players increases. Also, for a fixed number of players this temptation becomes weaker as c increases.
Tragedy of the Commons
Assume that each player i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} has the real interval [0, 1] as its set of strategies. Each player's strategy is his chosen fraction of a common resource. Let (see [22, Exercise 63 .1] and [29, pages 6-7] ): p i (s) := max(0, s i (1 − j∈N s j ) ). This payoff function reflects the fact that player's enjoyment of the common resource depends positively from his chosen fraction of the resource and negatively from the total fraction of the common resource used by all players. Additionally, if the total fraction of the common resource by all players exceeds a feasible level, here 1, then player's enjoyment of the resource becomes zero. Proposition 9. The selfishness level of the n-players Tragedy of the Commons game is ∞.
Intuitively, this result means that in this game no matter how much we 'involve' the players in sharing the social welfare we cannot achieve that they will select a social optimum.
Proof. We first determine the stable social optima of this game. Fix a joint strategy s and let t := j∈N s j . If t > 1, then the social welfare is 0. So assume that t ≤ 1. Then SW (s) = t(1 − t). This expression becomes maximal precisely when t = 
Also x = a. Hence
But s was an arbitrary stable social optimum, so the claim follows by Theorem 4 (i).
Cournot competition
We consider Cournot competition for n firms with a linear inverse demand function and constant returns to scale, see, e.g., [15, pages 174-175 ]. So we assume that each player i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} has a strategy set S i = R + and payoff function p i (s) := s i (a − b j∈N s j ) − cs i for some given a, b, c, where a > c ≥ 0 and b > 0.
The price of the product is represented by the expression a − b j∈N s j and the production cost corresponding to the production level s i by cs i . In what follows we rewrite the payoff function as p i (s) := s i (d − b j∈N s j ), where d := a − c. Note that the payoffs can be negative, which was not the case in the tragedy of the commons game. Still the proofs are very similar for both games.
Bertrand competition
Next, we consider Bertrand competition, a game concerned with a simultaneous selection of prices for the same product by two firms, see, e.g., [15, pages 175-177] . The product is then sold by the firm that chose a lower price. In the case of a tie the product is sold by both firms and the profits are split. We assume that each firm has identical marginal costs c > 0 and no fixed cost, and that each strategy set S i equals [c, Fix i ∈ {1, 2}. Note that if s i is slightly lower than d,
The claim now follows by Theorem 4 (i).
Extensions and future research directions
We introduced the selfishness level of a game as a new measure of discrepancy between the social welfare in a Nash equilibrium and in a social optimum. Our studies reveal that the selfishness level often provides more refined insights than other measures of inefficiency. We conclude by mentioning some natural extensions and future research directions.
Extensions
The definition of the selfishness level naturally extends to other solution concepts and other forms of games.
Mixed Nash equilibria. For mixed Nash equilibria we can simply adapt our definitions by stipulating that a strategic game G is α-selfish if a mixed Nash equilibrium of G(α) is a social optimum, where now we also allow social optima in mixed strategies. The selfishness level of G is then defined as before in (1) . For example, with this notion the selfishness level of the Matching Pennies game (Example 3) is 0 since its unique mixed Nash equilibrium, ( T ), is also a social optimum. The Matching Pennies game has no pure Nash equilibrium. In contrast, the game from Example 4 does have a pure Nash equilibrium. When we use mixed Nash equilibria its selfishness level also becomes 0. So in both games the selfishness level changed from ∞, when pure Nash equilibria are used, to 0, when mixed Nash equilibria are used. Further, a finite selfishness level of a finite game can decrease when we use mixed Nash equilibria. As an example consider the following 'amalgamation' of the Matching Pennies and Prisoner's Dilemma (with payoffs lowered by 2) games: This game has a unique stable social optimum, (C, C), and a unique pure Nash equilibrium, (D, D). It is easy to check using Theorem 4 (ii) that its selfishness level is 1. On the other hand, when we use mixed Nash equilibria then the selfishness level becomes 0. Indeed, ( Extensive games. We can also consider extensive games and subgame perfect equilibria. As an example consider the six-period version of the centipede game (see, e.g., [22] In its unique subgame perfect equilibrium each player chooses S in every period and the resulting payoffs are (1, 0). Since 5 + (6 + 5)α ≥ 6 + (4 + 6)α holds iff α ≥ 1, we can conclude that the (appropriately adapted) selfishness level for this game is 1.
We leave for future work the study of such alternatives.
Future research directions
Abstract games. It would be interesting to define the notion of a selfishness level for abstract games. These are games in which the payoffs are replaced by preference relations, see [23] . By a preference relation on a set A we mean here a linear ordering on A. More precisely, an abstract game is defined as (N, {S i } i∈N , { i } i∈N ) where each i is player's i preference relation defined on the set S 1 × · · · × S n of joint strategies. By a realization of an abstract game (N, {S i } i∈N , { i } i∈N ) we mean any strategic game (N, {S i } i∈N , {p i } i∈N ) such that for all i ∈ N and s, s ′ ∈ S 1 × · · · × S n we have s i s ′ iff p i (s) i p i (s ′ ).
Unfortunately, it is not clear how to do this. First, note that the notion of a Nash equilibrium is well defined for abstract games. However, there is no counterpart of the notion of a social optimum, since there is no 'global' preference relation on the set of joint strategies.
It is tempting to circumvent this difficulty by defining the notion of a selfishness level of an abstract game G using its realizations G ′ and the corresponding games G ′ (α(G ′ )), where α(G ′ ) is the selfishness level of G ′ . Unfortunately the resulting strategic games G ′ (α(G ′ )), where G ′ is a realization of G are not realizations of a single abstract game, so this 'detour' does not allow us to associate with the initial abstract game another one.
As an example take two realizations of the abstract Prisoner's Dilemma game and the corresponding games G ′ (α(G ′ )): Selfishness function. In our approach we assigned to each game a positive real number, its selfishness level. A natural generalization of this idea would be to assign to each game G the function f G : R + → R + , where f (α) equals the price of stability of the game G(α). Then the selfishness level of G is inf{α ∈ R + | f G (α) = 1}.
The function f G has been studied for altruistic extensions of linear congestion games and fair cost sharing games in [9, 12] . However, in these papers only upper bounds on f G are derived, which in light of the results obtained here cannot be tight. It would be interesting to determine f G exactly for these games. This would probably require a generalization of the characterization result presented in this paper.
Other social welfare functions. In this paper we exclusively concentrated on social welfare functions which are defined as the sum of the individual payoffs of the players. We leave it for future research to study the selfishness level of games for other social welfare functions, e.g., maximizing the minimum payoff of all players.
